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I. Aggression Today
We have updated our study for the following reason: to show that promoting
moral and discourse competence in juveniles can protect the entire society
against the increase of aggressive behavior. We do not refer here to the
therapeutic treatment of aggression, but only to the educational, specifically
based on the Konstanz Method of Dilemma Discussion (Lind 2016, 1997).
Educational prevention of aggression is viewed here as a remedy against social
helplessness in the face of interpersonal conflicts and as a reasonable
alternative to institutional sanctions and political oppression (Freire 2000,
Lind & Nowak 2009). Social helplessness can be observed when dealing with
interpersonal conflicts when reason, speech, dialogue and other democratic
means stop working. That might constitute a breaking point which moves even
democratic peoples to introduce sanctions and oppressive institutions, and to
elect authoritarian leadership, because these peoples face both aggression
around them and the helplessness in themselves. Democratic peoples are even
showing a readiness to abandon "a piece of autonomy" to their strong leaders
(Lind 2016, 45) to increase their safety. Such dialectics of low moral
competence in citizens and a high concentration of power in authoritarian
leaders is becoming popular in "countries with low levels of education" (Lind
2016, 48). Historical experience teaches that democracy can quickly transition
to dictatorship by means of peoples' legitimization. Such developments may
even lead to the termination of supranational conventions on preventing and
combating violence. To avoid such an acceleration of the “spiral of violence” and
the “circle of hostile attributions” (Lind 1993, 13) in social relations of all kinds,
societies need efficient education programs, at least for juveniles.
In Poland we observe protests which are democratic as long as the 
protesters are competent enough to respect everyone's human dignity and 
personal inviolability. Those protesters may be moved by civil disobedience, 
and by understood and appropriately chanelled thumos (Sloterdijk 2011), but 
they should avoid violence, the destruction of property, and related means 
which would lead them to harm, persecute and oppress others. A large number 
of engaged protesters is to be expected in all political regimes which 
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presuppose the inclusion of citizens as agents enabled to act constructively, e.g., 
not passive spectators or just passionate actors (Koyama 2012).   
To round off this psycho-political introduction, we would like to draw 
attention to the Polish educational and socializational context. The Polish 
education system performs well in PISA rankings and is due to start new 
reforms in 2017, but it is impoverished when it comes to the training of socio-
moral competences and violence-free conflict resolution. Schools and teachers 
are unable to empower and re-empower pupils against the development of 
aggressive behavior, xenophobia, discrimination, "destructive fanaticism" 
(Freire 2005, 35) and other dangerous phenomena. Research studies like ours 
call for the promotion of professional training and teaching methods oriented 
towards the prevention of aggression prevention through the strengthening of 
moral cognition and moral competence in students1. Such methods seem to be 
the most efficient and promising tool for bringing about a nonviolent society. 
Citizens with strong moral competence are able to say "Leaders... the People are 
speaking! We are united. We are our own voice," "Stay united and peaceful! Be 
heard!" (New Yorker protesters at JFK Terminal on 29 January, 2017, FB). 
Lind´s research findings confirm Freire's assertion (2000) that: "strong 
individuals do not use violence"; and Lind adds, "and where force is necessary 
they keep it within the limits of democratic laws (...) Finally, it seems that with 
the help of the concept of moral competence, we can also overcome the 
limitations of non-cognitive theories of moral development and education" 
(Lind 2016, 48), i.e., theories of indoctrination, imparting values, mimetic 
socialization, and physical violence, which were tools employed when raising 
children in archaic systems, and are still popular in authoritarian political 
systems.    
II. The Emotional Approach To Morality And Its Limitations
Celebrating emotions as the omnipotent premises of moral conduct reached its 
apotheosis with Jonathan Haidt (2001), Frans de Waal (2016) and many 
others. The career of the theory of emotional intelligence (Cavelzani & 
Esposito 2010) is impressive too. 
However, raw, uncultivated and strong emotions are too labile and 
ungovernable to provide moral conduct with reliable and justifiable motives. 
Thus, moral cognition remains a necessary aspect of moral judgments and 
decisions in complex, interpersonal and interactive contexts that are social and 
institutional. In those contexts, moral cognition manifests itself in violence-free 
1 The authors would like to thank Dr. Marta Mazurek (from the Municipal Office 
Against Discrimination of City Hall in Poznań, Poland) for her engagement in violence-
free local community and the execution of the Council of Europe Convention on 
preventing and combating domestic violence. 
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discourse acts, in which reason experiences itself as human "thinking codified in 
language" (Habermas 1986, 286), including illocutionary and perlocutionary 
forces replacing physical interplay such as violence, pressure, and 
manipulation. But discourse is not everything: it can also be laden with 
aggression, oppression and hate speech (Freire 2005). Unfortunately, only a 
few experts are familiar with the complex principle of discourse ethics 
established by Jürgen Habermas and Karl-Otto Apel (2017). The link between 
cognition, principled judgment, the self-control of aggression and violence-free 
social practice needs to be explored in order to uncover how we can protect our 
societies against the escalation of uncontrolled aggression and violence. 
Empowering sensitivity and empathy to more efficiently combat violence is not 
enough, either. It might even be counter-productive2, as we show in the next 
section. The issue of disconnecting moral cognition from strong emotions, 
including excessive empathy (Bloom 2016) and hostility, as well as anger and 
rage, has animated most recent discussions on how human beings make 
adequate decisions (Bloom 2016) in demanding social contexts. According to 
Greene, "deontological judgments are associated with increasing activity in the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, a brain region associated with cognitive control" 
(Greene 2009, 583; see also Miller & Cohen 2001). This is the case particularly 
when a person is confronted with socio-moral conflicts, or dilemmas. Making 
moral judgment should engage cognitive reflection and be accompanied by an 
emotional response (Greene et al. 2001, 2009; Bartels 2008) instead of being 
reduced to a purely emotional response. The "respective role" of emotion and 
cognition in human judgment in the face of "high conflict personal dilemmas" 
(Greene 2009, 582) and interpersonal conflicts, in particular when the other 
party uses violent means, remains underexamined. What is already known is 
that emotional conflicts and high affect overwhelm a person’s cognitive skills 
and evoke "negative emotional response conflicts" (Greene 2009, 582). 
Persons’ decisions and behaviors are difficult for them to navigate themselves, 
as they are diminished in cognitive processing, reflective and principled 
judgment making, and meta-reflection. For these reasons, the authors (Lind 
2 According to P. Bloom, an excessive empathy and sensitiveness weaken moral 
subjects and may lead to generous but unjust decisions. Freire explains that weakness 
in terms of his theory of liberation: "only power that springs from the weakness of the 
oppressed will be sufficiently strong to free both [the oppressed and the oppressor]. 
Any attempt to 'soften' the power of the oppressor in deference to the weakness of the 
oppressed almost always manifests itself in the form of false generosity; indeed, the 
attempt never goes beyond this. In order to have the continued opportunity to express 
their 'generosity,' the oppressors must perpetuate injustice as well. An unjust social 
order is the permanent fount of this "generosity," which is nourished by death, 
despair, and poverty" (Freire 2005, 45). With power which can protect a person 
against false generosity, injustice and violent behavior we mean strong moral 
cognition and interhuman discourse. Cognition and discourse are too fundamental for 
civil disobedience and legitimate anger (see Rawls 1999, Thoreau 1849, Pearson 
2001). 
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2016, Bloom 2016, Greene 2009) advocate the primacy of moral cognition 
instead of that of moral affect (Piaget 1981). For Lind, cognition and emotion 
"are much more closely connected than we think" (Lind 2016, 29). For Bloom 
(2016) they should be disconnected when people aspire to make adequate, 
right and just moral judgments. Fortunately, "although they are innate, our 
feelings change and develop as a result of our experiences. That is, we 
ourselves can use our judgment and reason to influence them purposefully 
through training" (Lind 2016, p. 29). Linking the recent cognitive turn, social 
context-related empathy, and the self-control of aggression together, Martha 
Nussbaum points out that “children who develop a capacity for sympathy or 
compassion—often through empathetic perspectival experience—understand 
what their aggression has done to another separate person” (Nussbaum 2010, 
37). In sum, “empathy is not morality” (cf., 37). Practical decisions, which move 
persons to action, require more than (even the best and high) affective 
excitement. They require a trained moral and discourse competence (Lind 
2016, 29-36). Unfortunately, "'natural' opportunities for moral learning are out 
of reach for children" (Lind 2016, 31) even in democratic societies. They must 
be created by professionals in classrooms. A basic moral competence cannot be 
defined in terms of evolutionary biology and the physiology of the brain. It is 
"the ability to solve problems and conflicts on the basis of universal moral 
principles through thinking and discussion, instead of using violence, deceit, 
and force. Based on this definition ..." (Lind 2016, 45) we cannot expect 
advanced ethical and meta-ethical operations such as the justification of social 
conventions and lawgiving. Lind´s definition stresses the ability to apply already 
proved and approved internal principles that people actually respect when 
making moral decisions. Of course, some people examine principles and their 
justifications too, but the majority of non-experts have no chance of reaching 
such advances in their cognitive development, for many systemic and personal 
reasons. Moral competence offers just a rational, discursive and efficient 
alternative against both violence and helplessness when a decision maker is 
challenged by a socio-moral conflict. Consequently, 
Based on this definition, we assume that the greater the problem, 
the better this ability must be developed. If the problems grow 
over our heads because social change is great, but our educational 
institutions (parents, schools, and universities) have not given 
sufficient opportunity for the development of moral competence, 
then we fall back on lower forms of conflict resolution such as 
violence, fraud, and force. If that also does not help, then we call 
for a strong power that solves our problems and conflicts for us – 
which amounts to the abolition of democratic coexistence in favor 
of dictatorship (Lind 2016, 45)3. 
3 Strengthened moral competence complements value education often celebrated as a 
panacea for conflicts, hostility, violence etc. However, values in plenty and diversity as 
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III. The Strength of Humans is Moral Competence,
Aggression Is Their Weakness
The growth of moral competence has a distinct impact on increasing the self-
control of aggressive behavior and violence (Lind 2010, 2016). According to
Lind (1977, 1), violent behavior correlates with the lowest level of moral
competence. Lind disagrees with the statement that aggression is a lasting
stigmatic and devilish attitude in the personality, or that "good people"
suddenly "turn evil" and become "perpetrators of violence" (Zimbardo 2007,
xi). It is cognition that protects people from employing violence; and it is
cognition that allows them to deal with conflicts and problems in a rational and
peaceful way. It is “cognitive processes that decide about how long, how
explosive, how strong or how weak the aggressive reaction will be performed”
(Lind 1993, 15). A positive correlation between high moral competence and
the rejection of violence was found by Peisert, Bargel, Lind et al. (FORM
project, N=2000). Whereas the "deficient competence of solving problems”
(“mangelnde Problemlösefähigkeit”) was identified as a contributor to violent
behaviors (Lind 1993/2010, 4).
There is no place for aggression in human life and society because 
humans have no natural predators. However, according to modern 
anthropologists – especially Herder and Gehlen – the human condition is 
imperfect, "vulnerable," "frail and weak" (Mängelwesen) (Herder 2016, 97; 
Gehlen 1981). Instinctive aggression empowers non-human living beings 
against their natural enemies, but in case of humans, instinctive aggression 
implies a weakness of the human as a social and cultural being as well. As it 
leads to violence and conflict between kinsman, aggression is destructive for 
humanity, humanness and human development. Yet the unique strength of 
humans is embodied in their cognition, awareness, language and thinking, and 
in their use of dialogue as the best protection against violence, as the 
foundation of peace, and as the most favorable opportunity for human growth. 
These protections are not really natural; they are only nurtured by some 
biological resources shared with other animals. In their essence, their are 
artificial and cultural. They may easily regress and disappear when humans are 
uncultivated, mal-educated (Lind 1985), or oppressed (Lind & Nowak 2009). 
The anthropological approach we briefly recalled here shows aggression to be 
a biological relic in humankind. Humanity must deal with it in a way that is 
probably impossible for non-human animals.  
known today can neither be melted together nor offer one 'regulatory' system for all. 
Rather, it is a legal regulatory system's role to protect an equal free room for 
individuals to follow their values, as Gustav Radbruch (2003) puts it. Moral 
competence enables individuals to manage that free room autonomously, with respect 
for others. 
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Still, such classic theories only provide a general approach to human 
aggression. Neither the social sciences nor evolutionary biology and 
psychology have managed to elaborate a comprehensive explanation of 
aggression for special cases and new social opportunities (for example, feeling 
endangered by terror attacks or sharing a parent cultural habitat with radically 
other cultures). Conflict psychology and conflict neuroscience also show that 
situations involving conflict between human beings are perceived and 
interpreted as "dangerous" in their brains. Thus, situations involving conflict 
have an impact on the brain, evoke biochemical reactions in the brain and 
physiological reactions in the entire organism, and result in a strong effect on 
human behavior way. Excitement, stress, and reactive or impulsive aggression 
(Dorfman et al. 2014) are connected with these reactions. They are shared by 
most primates (Barr & Driscoll 2014). However, these biologically and 
environmentally boosted behaviors do not occur in a deterministic manner. 
People are overwhelmed by their aggressive reactions as long as their cognitive 
ability to navigate their action remains poorly developed. The human mind's 
developmental potential includes its ability to be modulated and set into trained 
cognitive self-control (before social control and sanctions enter), or at least a 
large part of them can be. Of course there are differences between children, 
young adults and adolescents (Buchmann et al. 2014) related to the 
developmental processes. The details are beyond the scope of this work, but we 
can refer to the developmental time window in which the prevention of 
aggressive behavior is still possible. Frans de Waal and other primatologists 
assume that, similarly to other primates, humans (including children) are 
provided with a "natural" ability to resolve conflicts. But humans often face 
non-natural conflicts and tensions produced by other humans. Those conflicts 
may weaken their evolutionary ability to resolve conflicts in a conciliatory way 
and "to interact subsequently in a friendly manner" (Cords & Aureli 2000, 
177), and even stimulate the development of aggression. Thus, one has to 
rethink the problem of aggression beyond natural history, within 
contemporary social realities, however, without reducing it to normative 
patterns, the post-conflict peacemaking tendency, or post-tantrum affiliation 
naturally increasing with age, as was observed in various cultures by 
Butovskaya et al. (2000). What is often described as "natural," most probably 
results from the socially stimulated growth, stagnation or regression (Lind 
1985A) of moral cognition. We call that cognition socio-moral competence and 
try to explain its central role in aggression control and prevention. It is quiet low 
in those who show far-right and ultraconservative convictions and, at the same 
time, more likely accept violence towards immigrants and refugees, as the 
recent Polish report of Centrum Badań nad Uprzedzeniami (CBU) (Bieńkowski 
& Świderska 2017; see also Nowak & Steć 2017) shows. 
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IV. Reactive Aggression and Emotion vs. Proactive
Aggression and Cognition
Researchers have identified reactive aggression as the most common type of 
aggression in school-aged children; it is connected with such phenomena as 
hyperactivity, attention deficits, stimulation seeking, anxiety, impulsivity, and 
low school motivation. “Reactive aggression has been conceptualized as a 
fear-induced, irritable, and hostile affect-laden defensive response to 
provocation” (Raine et al. 1998, 161; compare Dodge 1991 and Meloy 1988). 
Reactive aggression “involves a lack of inhibitory functions, reduced self-
control, and increased impulsivity” (Raine et al. 1998, 181). The opposite of 
proactive aggression, reactive aggression requires a high level of emotion and a 
low level of resistance to provocation and frustration. It is also characterized by 
feelings of guilt and outbursts of anger when the individual is confronted with 
an interpersonal conflict. All these characteristics indicate the low level of 
conscious emotions and cognitively governed affectivity. Strong and difficult 
emotions prevail, “drive” behavior immediately, and overwhelm cognitive 
processing in the face of a demanding decision context including controversy, 
cognitive and affective dissonance, time pressure, and other factors making 
decisions difficult for decision makers. This is one of the core reasons for 
strengthening moral cognition.  
Dodge (1991) noted that “proactive aggression in the human and 
animal literature has been characterized as instrumental, organized, and ‘cold-
blooded’, with little evidence of autonomic arousal” (pp. 374-393). In proactive 
aggression, a low need for social contacts with peers and adults, a low affective 
level, and a low intrinsic motivation occur in combination. Proactive aggression 
is “characterized by (...) blunted affect and stimulation-seeking tendencies” 
(Dodge 1991, 374-393). Olweus (1994) stated that proactive aggression seems 
to be rooted in complex cognitive, conscious and even reflected processes, 
rather than in a spontaneous emotional reaction. It is too disconnected from 
empathy, "affective primacy" (Piaget 1981, 11-74; 1976, 8) and the “affective 
exchange” with others (Lind 1985b). 
V. Cognitive Empathy
Does empathy provide humans with a restraint against the development of 
aggressive behavior?  After two decades of empathy renaissance in 
evolutionary neuropsychology, recent research seems to be revising a long-
standing consensus (see Knoch et al. 20064) about the role of empathy in moral 
4 The research findings of Knoch et al. (2006) explored the psychopathological sources 
of low empathetic moral decision-making: "patients with right prefrontal lesions are 
characterized by the inability to behave in normatively appropriate ways despite the 
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cognition, as well as about the definitions of both empathy and the 
sociopathic/psychopatic traits of human behavior. As Bloom's (2017) reports, 
fMRI experiments with football fans showed that watching a suffering fellow of 
the opposite fan club excited the brain areas responsible for pleasure in the 
participants of the experiment, while watching a suffering fellow of the same 
club was more likely to excite empathy for pain (Bloom 2017, 2016; Lamm & 
Majdandžić 2015). Furthermore, as Avenanti et al. (2010) showed, compassion 
and empathy on a very basic interpersonal reaction level is diminished when 
people face fellow humans belonging to a racial/ethnic outgroup. The 
research findings reported above stress the fact that “antisocial behavior", 
which is "a particularly frequent problem during childhood and a predictor of 
later criminality” (Lösel & Beelman 2007, 84-109), may be rooted in, and 
boosted by, numerous factors. Some of them lie beyond a person’s self-
consciousness and self-control, but the self-control can be improved, trained 
and re-rained. Discovering that evolutionary, genetically, environmentally and 
physiologically supported empathy — and sympathy or compassion — might 
be more likely within same, homogeneous (ethnic, racial) tribe must be 
interpreted as a warning signal. That warning signal should encourage 
education, socialisation and resocialisation researchers to develop training for 
strengthening the cognitive kinds of empathy, disconnected from raw affection 
and spontaneous emotion. For Paul Bloom (2013, 2017) and Tania Singer, 
empathy means something very different, e.g., less physiological reaction-
related, less biased, but a more justice-oriented and prosocial attitude, i.e. 
notably cognitive in nature. It involves respect, open-mindedness, charity, 
solidarity, care and support. 
Undoubtedly, low empathy (be it cognitive or emotional5) and 
aggression are not synonyms. It is rather that the growth of cognitive empathy 
and moral competence contributes to better self-control of aggression. A 
violence-free life context protects against the escalation of the aggressive 
tendency: "(...) exposure to violence may affect children’s adaptation and 
functioning. This perspective emphasizes that a child’s ultimate adaptation or 
fact that they possess the judgmental abilities necessary for normative behavior, 
supporting the importance of right prefrontal areas for normatively appropriate 
behaviors. Thus, a dysfunction of the right DLPFC, or its specific connections, may 
underlay certain psychopathological disorders that are characterized by excessive 
selfish tendencies and a failure to obey basic social norms (...). Finally, the reported 
findings provide evidence for theoretical approaches to social cognition and decision-
making that stress the fundamental role of DLPFC in neural networks that support 
deliberative processes in human decision-making" (Knoch et al. 2006). 
5 Bloom (2016) shows that persons open for high excitement and affection more often 
tend to violent behavior, for ex. they require stronger revenge and punishments for 
offenders, allow militant sanctions and physical violence as political power means, 
and they allow tortures in interrogation. A strong emotional identification with 
particular persons leads to discrimination against others and to the omission of the 
entire group, society, humanity, common goods, interests, and holistic justice. 
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maladaptation occurs as a result of the interplay between the evolving 
individual and changing contextual factors (e.g., the family environment), 
underlining the importance of mediating variables that may contribute to 
outcomes" (Yoon 2015, 106). In the last decade, European societies have 
experienced an increase in social aggression as a result of people's low socio-
moral competence, which has been challenged by new intercultural and 
multiethnic experiences, dilemmas and conflicts. We decided to revisit and 
revise our research findings gathered during a program offered to young 
offenders and the aggressive children of immigrants we trained in 2009-2010 
in Poland and Switzerland. We did this because these research findings show 
that using an appropriate training program can promote both moral 
competence and cognitive empathy in juveniles to protect them against the 
growth of aggression, harassment, discrimination etc. During years that 
passed between our pilot study and today we have observed how the tendency 
of aggressive behavior has been increasing, along with social tolerance of 
violence, in particular in the Middle-European, still mono-ethnic subcultures 
and far-right groups. We are far from saying that any particular ethnic, cultural 
or religious group is more susceptible to, or tolerant of violence than other 
groups. Aggression which manifests itself in various observable forms of 
behavior is always interrelated with the environment in both the biological and 
social context. Biological reactions, instincts and intuitions are not enough to 
handle social contexts which work in a different way than those in an animal 
herd, or archaic tribe. The extremist groups (Lind 1998) seem to follow tribal 
behavioral patterns including lynching, vendetta (Nowak 2015), and terror.   
We agree with scholars who strongly advocate social–cognitive 
development (called reason in rationalist philosophy) and the use of cognitive 
skills in modern social contexts. Living as a Socius requires cognitive strength, 
which needs to be trained and retrained to better face the new opportunities 
and challenges created by social and technological progress. Humans create 
and manage their complex habitat by means of their cognitive skills so they 
gradually stop following their animal instinctive compass (Gehlen 1986). 
Cognition should replace that compass. In the other case, humans are doomed 
to helplessness, or developing risky and violent behaviors. Negotiating social 
conflicts' solutions by brutal means is one of them. In this paper, we are not 
interested in how can societies protect themselves against aggressors; we 
rather ask, how to protect an average individual against becoming aggressor. 
Fortunately, the development in education provides teachers of all 
levels with useful methods for promoting moral cognition, moral competence 
and cognitive empathy, as well as with measuring instruments to assess the 
efficiency of these methods. KMDD is undoubtedly a leading one (Lind 2016; 
Nowak 2013; Lind & Nowak 2015; Lind & Nowak 2009). We applied it in 2010 
in our pilot study as a tool for the prevention of aggression and cognitive 
development. Next studies followed (Nowak 2013; Nowak & Steć 2017). 
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VI. Two KMDD and MCT Based Pilot Studies on Aggression
Prevention with Juveniles in Poland and Switzerland
We offered dilemma-discussion training in two educational institutions: 1) a
reform institution for juvenile female offenders integrated with high school
(Wielkopolska voivodeship), and 2) a Swiss primary school (Kanton Thurgau),
we initiated the project “Aggression Prevention with KMDD” (Schillinger,
Nowak, & Urbańska 2009). Group 1 included female offenders aged 13–21
(N=14) from Poland. Group 2 included multicultural juveniles (N=13, gender
characteristics: 6 males, 7 females) with hyperactivity and an observable
aggressive tendency in male immigrants.
The training composed of 5 to 10 KMDD sessions 90 minutes each 
and was thought of as an experimental program of aggression prevention 
(proactive aggression). The core measurement instrument was the Moral 
Competence Test (Lind 1984, 1986, 2002, 2010, 2016; Bargel et al. 1982). Data 
on aggressive behavior tendencies (in particular anger and anxiety) and violent 
behavior were self-reported and collected with the help of the Reactive–
Proactive Aggression Questionnaire (Raine & Dodge 2006). Observations of 
violent behavior were reported by class teachers who used the Gasteiger Form.  
Georg Lind created a precise experimental instrument (MCT) to 
measure the growth of moral competence as a result of moral competence 
training. The MCT is based on two dilemmas (i.e., moral tasks to be resolved by 
participants) provided with 12 arguments each (6 in favor and 6 against the 
solution of the dilemma, 24 arguments all together). It assesses the manifest 
judgment behavior of participants who evaluate solutions to dilemmas, as well 
as arguments designed according to the six different types of moral orientation 
(Lind 2016, 67).  
"The MCT produces what is called a 'C-score', the 'C' standing for 
competence. The C-score indicates to which degree a participant 
rates the argument of the best by their moral quality, rather than 
by other factors like their opinion agreement. In other words, the 
C-score is designed to show how able people are to engage in a
moral discussion with a difficult issue rather than obstruct it by
insisting on their opinion regardless of what speaks in its favor or
against it. (...) The C-score has been constructed so that it ranges
from 0 to 100. A C-score of zero means that the individual's
pattern of responses to the MCT does not manifest any moral
competence. A C-score of one hundred [C-points] means that the
individual's response pattern perfectly meets the criterion of
moral competence" (Lind 2016, 69).
In the group of Polish female juveniles, a moral competence growth of 10 C-
pointswas achieved after 8 KMDD sessions conducted over several months. 
This pilot study found that young delinquent females with lower levels of 
physical violence (blue-marked graph) achieved much better results from the 
dilemma discussion trainings than females with higher levels (red-marked 
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graph). However, both groups reported strong anxiety. All the participants were 
observed by teachers for a period of eight months. The teachers observed that 
the "blue" group members participated more actively in all the phases of the 
dilemma discussions, and they showed increasing emotional self-control, even 
when confronted with controversies and opposing views in the group 
discussions during the KMDD sessions. In contrast, the "red" group members 
often showed anxiety and uncontrolled emotions. The "red" group had more 
difficulty with translating affects to verbal expressions, arguments and 
counterarguments. All the participants were engaged in the KMDD sessions 
throughout the dilemma presentations and for a few minutes afterwards. They 
later asked for more dilemma-stories just “to listen” and to experience their 
dramatic impact. Understanding and expressing their own conflicting feelings 
and intuitive judgments seemed to overwhelm them. As KMDD instructors, we 
observed signs of interpersonal hostility and anxiety, in particular during the 
voting phase of the dilemma discussions. Black blindfolds were used to avoid 
quarrels about voting in favor/against the decision made by the protagonists of 
the dilemmas.  
Figure 1. Konstanz Method of Dilemma-Discussion in a reform institution for female juvenile 
offenders (Urbańska, Schillinger, Hemmerling, & Nowak, Poland 2010). 
One more issue could be discussed in the context of gender (Friedman 1985). 
During the KMDD sessions with Swiss pupils and young Polish delinquent 
females, no moral deficiency of females in comparison to males was observed. 
We avoided selecting gender-related dilemma stories and offered stories with 
gender-balanced contents, covering the topics of care, justice, responsibility, 
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and common social norms. No gender gap in the moral orientations expressed 
in the participants' speeches was observable; only some particular differences6.  
It was very different in the Swiss primary school children’s training. 
Figure 2. Swiss primary school pupils (70% of immigrant descents) MCT study. 
We observed two different phenomena in a Swiss group of 11-year-old male 
and female pupils in a multiethnic class with learning problems, low German-
language competency, hyperactivity, emotional aggression and anxiety, 
harassment, hate speech and fights, which were reported by the class teachers. 
After two dilemma discussions, the boys already started controlling their over-
excitement and showiness, and behaved much better than they did at the 
beginning of our intervention. In addition, the girls became less fearful and 
increasingly talkative. They engaged in the discussions, and their speeches and 
arguments became noticeably longer and better ordered over time. The girls 
learned to speak, and the boys learned to listen. We did not observe anxious 
behavior in the classroom. At the end of the KMDD-intervention, both the girls 
and boys stated that they appreciated “the different viewpoints because it is 
really interesting to know how people think.” Even very shy children and 
children sitting at corner tables started cooperating with others (in contrast to 
the strong exclusion that we observed earlier). Using the same measuring 
instruments (MCT, Dodge Scale and Gasteiger Questionnaire) the findings 
showed increased competence in moral judgment; however, this was mainly 
among girls (over 10 C-points). During the post-MCT conducted in the group, 
all the male students were extremely excited by the football match that followed 
6 Just to recall: "In Moral Stages, Kohlberg has argued that justice and caring are not 
'two different tracks of moral development which are either independent or in polar 
opposition to one another,' that 'many moral situations or dilemmas do not pose a 
choice between one or the other orientation, but rather call out a response which 
integrates both orientations,' and that considerations of caring need not conflict with 
those of justice 'but may be integrated into a response consistent with justice, 
especially at the postconventional level'" (Friedman 1985, 28).  
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after our meeting in the classroom. Their hearts all belonged to the Football 
World Cup finale 2010. 
Based on these findings, we suggest that dilemma discussion training 
at an early school age could help children to understand and verbally and 
rationally “construct” (Lind 2010) their affects at a conscious level and, finally, 
to train their moral competence. Furthermore, a moral and democratic 
education would facilitate the achievement of these goals if teachers were 
encouraged to apply the highly efficient didactic principles of the Konstanz 
Method of Dilemma Discussion in other school subjects. Guided dilemmatic 
reflection, cooperative reasoning with peers personifying very different views, 
dealing with opposite views in peaceful, verbal and non-verbal communication, 
and experiencing how conflicts can be resolved by a rational and dialogical 
inquiry instead of physical violence, insult, bullying, discrimination, etc. could 
serve to strengthen all kinds of socio-moral competences and to minimize the 
risk of aggression in societies (Holditch-Niolon et al. 2015). In the Swiss group, 
we observed an evolving dialogical readiness and reciprocal inclusion across 
four different nationalities. The participants were engaged in deliberating on 
the dilemmas and conflicts typical for everyday life, despite cultural differences. 
Similarly, increasing reciprocal attentiveness and recognition were observed 
during our KMDD trainings in other Polish groups in which estrangement and 
tensions were resolved and mutual respect increased. To conclude in 
Habermas' terms, personal behavior and interpersonal relations in which 
personal moral and discourse competencies manifest themselves is a 
precondition for the rationalisation of society. Rationalisation does not begin 
purely from abstract principles and procedures; the same goes for democracy, 
which does not begin only with constitutions and philosophical treatises, but 
also in human minds and interhuman relationships (Nowak 2013). Experiences 
reported in this paper might be supportive for teachers, professionals and lay 
persons faced with everyday forms of aggressive behavior, in particular in 
multiethnic and multicultural school contexts. Those teachers can involve the 
KMDD, or its elements, in their regular classes in order to foster moral 
competence in pupils. At the same time, more specific and advanced forms of 
aggression, harassment, bullying etc. require special therapeutic programs 
(see Schanzenbächer 2003, Weidner 2001) to which a dilemma discussion may 
too contribute as a powerful facilitator of moral-cognitive development. 
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Abstract: Aggression in juveniles may increase even in modern societies 
and manifest itself in countless forms of violence, including harming, 
persecution, abuse, pressure, hostility, etc. A large number of studies on the 
evolutionary, psychological and sociological origins of aggression are 
available. However, we lack cognitive remedies to counter developing 
tendencies towards aggressive behavior. Georg Lind's book How to teach 
morality. Promoting deliberation and discussion, reducing violence and deceit 
(2016) offers such a remedy based on his long–term (1976–2017) 
experiences with dilemma discussion training. This paper draws on Lind's 
conception of strengthening socio-moral competence as the most efficient 
remedy against aggression. It also revisits the ongoing theories of 
empathy. Finally, it revises the pilot research study that we conducted 
2010 among Polish and Swiss juveniles7. That study focused on the following 
hypotheses: Lind's method of dilemma discussion (KMDD) can train and 
retrain moral competence in juveniles that show a slight inclination 
towards aggressive behavior. Strong moral competence may prevent 
further maldevelopment, in particular interpersonal and collective violence.    
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